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I.

ADDITIONAL PARTIES

There are no additional parties to this appeal that are not set forth in the cover page
caption.

II.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant KTM Health Care,

Inc.

("Appellee" or

"KTM") appeal the final judgment issued by the trial court on March 25, 2016. [R. at
3966]. On July 5, 2016, the Utah Supreme Court assigned the appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals. [R. at 4106]. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over the appeal and crossappeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)U).

III.
A.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Appellants' Issues. 1
I.

Whether the trial court erred when it held that the jury's initial special
verdict form, in which the jury determined both that (a) the Appeliants had
breached the relevant contract, and (b) a mutual mistake existed between

~

the parties at the time the contract was signed, was so inconsistent that it
required the jury to reconvene and complete a second special verdict form
to correct the perceived inconsistency. [R. 2569; 3898, p. 328].
2.

Whether the trial court erred when it denied Appellants' Motion for New
Trial based on the insufficiency of evidence where the jury awarded

1

Appellants' "Issues" are directly quoted from Appellants' Brief. [Appellants' Brief, pp.
6-7].
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consequential damages to plaintiff based on costs incurred by a non-party
entity. [R. 4091 ].

B.

2

Appellee' s Issues.
1.

Issue No. I: Did the trial court err in excluding testimony from KTM's
expert, Bryan Nichols (as to renewable contracts in the industry), on the
basis that such testimony was "not relevant because it would not help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact issue in this
case."?
a.

Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. State v. Hollen, 2002 UT
35,

<JI

66, 44 P.3d 794; State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84,

CJ1

~

6, 223 P.3d

1103.
~

b.

Issue Preserved At: [R. 0347-0349; 0350-0389; 0427-0438; 04410448; I 033-1034]. 3

2.

Issue No. 2: Did the trial court err in determining that the economic loss
rule and doctrine of election of remedies required a dismissal of KTM' s
fraud-based claims?
a.

Standard of Review: Correctness. Overstock.com, Inc. v.

2

As discussed hereinafter, the costs incurred were part of certain demands made by
Appellants that required that a third-party be hired.
3
Citations to the record are indicated by the letter "R" followed by the page ranges where
the documents are located in the record. Citations to the trial transcript are indicated by
the record number assigned to the corresponding volume, followed by the page number
and the line number which are separated by colon. Where the citation includes multiple
pages, the starting page/line number is separated from the ending page/line number by a
hyphen (e.g. R. 3895, 13:6-14:5 would indicate that the citation begins on page 13, line 6
and continues through page 14, line 5).
Page 2 of 61
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SmartBargains, Inc., 2008 UT 55, 9I 12, 192 P.3d 858.
b.

Issue Preserved At: September 5, 2014 Minute Entry (attached as
Addendum I); [R. 1455-1465; 1489-1494; 1530-1535; 1767-1768;
1828-1829; 2261-2262; 2263-2288; 2291-2292; 2324-2326; 23392347; 2432-2434]; [R. 3898, 248:7-14; 250:2-5].

3.

Issue No. 3: Did the trial court err in determining that KTM was not
entitled to prejudgment interest under the statute?

a.

Standard of Review: Correctness. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003
UT 41, 9I 16, 82 P.3d 1064.

b.

Issue Preserved At: [February 10, 2016 Minute Entry, attached as
Addendum 2]; [R. 2702-2726; 3899-3912; 3913-3924; 3925-3927;
3930-3934; 3937-3943; 3959-3960].

IV.
~

~

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

Utah R. Evid. 401. Test for Relevant Evidence
Evidence is relevant if:
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.
Utah R. Evid. 702. Testimony by Experts
(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), a witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion
or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for expert
testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or methods that are
underlying in the testimony
(I) are reliable,
(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts.
Page 3 of 61
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(c) The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the underlying
principles or methods, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their
application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by the relevant expert
community.
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1. Interest rates-Contracted rate-Legal Rate
( 1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of their contract.
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal rate of
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be I 0%
per annum.
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any penalty or interest
charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations
made before May 14, 1981.

V.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
This case involves claims by KTM against Kolob and Apex arising out of a

contract whereby KTM was to exclusively provide pharmacy services to a rehabilitation
center operated by Kolob. KTM alleges that Kolob and Apex fraudulently induced KTM
to enter into the contract and then subsequently re-negotiated an already existing contract
with their current provider (SCP

Pharmacy, hereinafter "SCP") for an additional

extended period. KTM asserts that Kolob and Apex used their contract with KTM as
leverage to option better terms with SCP. 4 After a trial on the matter, the jury awarded
KTM breach of contract damages and also consequential damages.
On cross-appeal, KTM alleges that the trial court erred by: (I) refusing to allow
KTM's expert, Bryan Nichols, to testify as to the industry standard regarding the term of
4

SCP is sometimes referred to as "Omnicare" in the record.
Page 4 of 61
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ill

closed-door pharmacy contracts; (2) dismissing KTM's fraud-based claims due to the
G;

economic loss rule and election of remedies doctrines; and (3) refusing to grant KTM
statutory prejudgment interest pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (2).
On direct appeal Ko lob and Apex allege that the trial court erred by: ( 1) allowing

~

the jury to clarify the inconsistent finding that: (a) Apex and Kolob breached the contract
and covenant of good faith and fair dealing (entitling KTM to a damage award as well as
attorney's fees) and (b) a mutual mistake existed at the time the parties executed the
contract; and (2) denying Appellants' Motion for New Trial based on insufficiency of
~

evidence to support the jury's award of consequential damages.

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition of Trial Court.

I.

KTM filed a Verified Complaint on October I, 20 IO against Appellant SG

~

Nursing Home, LLC dba Kolob Care and Rehabilitation of St. George ("Kolob").
[R. 0001-0015].
2.

KTM's Verified Complaint alleged that Kolob had breached a certain "Facility
Agreement with Provider Pharmacy" (the "Contract"). [R. 0002]. [A copy of the
Contract is found at R. 3895, Tr. Exhibit 1].

3.

In general, the Contract required Kolob to use KTM "for all of its requirements for
pharmacy-related Services and Products .... " [R. 007].

4.

KTM filed an Amended Complaint on February 2, 20 I I, which Amended
Complaint was based upon the same factual allegations as the initial Complaint

(0j)

but which

included claims for:

(i) breach of contract,

(ii) promissory

estoppel/detrimental reliance, (iii) negligence, (iv) fraud in the inducement, (v)
Page 5 of 61
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constructive fraud,

(vi)

intentional

misrepresentation,

and

(vii)

negligent

misrepresentation. [R. 0035-0067].
5.

On April 25, 2012, KTM filed a second amended complaint adding Appellant
Apex Health Care Solutions, Inc. ("Apex") as an additional defendant. [R. at
0292-0344].

6.

In the second amended complaint, KTM alleged that Apex was Kol ob' s "parent
company" and was therefore liable to KTM for damages under theories of alter
ego, agency, joint venture and respondeat superior. [R. 0293, 'Il'Il 3-6; 0300, CJI54 ].

7.

KTM's claim against Kolob generally remained unchanged. [R. at 0292-0344].

8.

Appellants subsequently filed answers to the second amended complaint in which
they asserted, inter alia, that KTM's claims "are barred, in whole or in part, based
on a mutual mistake." [R. 0402; 0426].

Kolob's Motion to Strike Testimony of Bryan Nichols
9.

On April 30, 2012, Kolob made a motion to strike one of KTM's proposed
experts, Bryan Nichols. Kolob argued that Mr. Nichols' testimony as to the
industry standard regarding the terms and duration of closed-door pharmacy
contracts (including renewal periods) should be stricken because Mr. Nichols'
proposed testimony was: ( 1) inadmissible under Utah R. Evid. 702, (2) irrelevant
and (3) purely speculative. [R. 0347-0389]. 5

5

The Contract was for an initial term from June 28, 2010 to June 28, 2011. However, the
Contract also includes a provision that "[ a ]ny renewals of this Agreement shall be made
thirty (30) days prior to the end of this Agreement and evidence by a Memorandum of
Renewal to be attached to this original Agreement." [R. 0007, see 1 1].
Page 6 of 61
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Ci;

I 0.
~

KTM filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to strike asserting that Mr.
Nichols' testimony was relevant under Utah R. Evid. 401 because his testimony
would be valuable to the jury in their determining the number of years for which
KTM would be able to recover under an "expectation damages" analysis. KTM
also argued that Mr. Nichols' testimony was not speculative or unreliable and that
the determination of reliability of the testimony should be left to the trier of fact

~

(i.e. the jury). [R. 0427-0438]
11.

Kolob filed a reply memorandum in support of the motion to strike. [R. 00410448].

~

12.

After conducting a hearing on the matter, the trial court entered an order striking
Mr. Nichols' testimony finding that " ... there are not sufficient facts in this case to
support the proposed testimony of KTM's expert, Bryan Nichols, that Kolob
would have renewed its pharmacy provider agreement with KTM for at least six
years had Kolob begun using KTM for its pharmaceutical needs in 20 I 0.
Therefore, such testimony is not relevant because it would not help the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue in this case." [R. 1034].

Election of Remedies/Economic Loss
13.

On or about May 7, 2014, during a pretrial/motions hearing, the Court affirmed its
ruling that KTM could maintain its fraud and negligence-based claims. [R. 1768].

14.

During the pretrial conference of June 5, 2014, Appellants renewed their request
that the Court exclude KTM's fraud claim pursuant to a theory of election of

Page 7 of 61
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remedies. The Court permitted the parties the opportunity to provide supplemental
briefing on the issue. [June 5, 2014 Minute Entry, attached as Addendum 3].
15.

Both parties provided additional briefing. [R. 2098-2104; 2122-2131]. On
September 5, 2014, the trial court issued a ruling dismissing KTM's fraud-based
claims under an election of remedies analysis. The trial court also noted that any
post-contract tort claims based on the breach of contract were precluded by the
economic loss rule [See September 5, 2014 Minute Entry, Addendum]].

16.

KTM filed a Motion to Reconsider the dismissal of the fraud-based claims arguing
that the economic loss doctrine did not bar common law fraud and

i£J

misrepresentation claims that are based on independent duties. [R. 2263-2288].
17.

Appellants opposed arguing that the trial court's dismissal of KTM's fraud claims
Gtil

was based primarily on the doctrine of election of remedies, not on the economic
loss rule. [R. 2339-2347].
18.

KTM responded in its Reply that at the September 5, 2014 hearing, the trial
court's reliance on the election of remedies doctrine was limited to pre-contract
torts. Because KTM 's allegations of fraudulent conduct were related to the period
after the Contract was executed, those torts were not precluded by the economic
loss doctrine. [R. 2433].

19.

On October 8, 2014, in ruling on the election of remedies question, the trial court
determined that under the theory that it had been fraudulently induced into signing
the Contract, KTM was required to either avoid the contract and seek damages
(such as reliance and punitive damages) or alternatively affirm the contract and
Page 8 of 61
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~

seek breach of contract damages. The trial court found that KTM had chosen to
affirm the Contract and was therefore precluded by the doctrine of election of
remedies and the economic loss rule from pursuing its remaining tort claims (i.e.
fraud in the inducement, constructive fraud, intentional misrepresentation and
negligent representation). The trial court dismissed all of those claims. [R. 23242326].
Denial of Prejudgment Interest
20.

Trial was held trial on KTM's remaining claims on October 27-31, 2014. The jury
found that Kolob breached the Contract as well as the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing and that KTM had suffered "loss profit" damages in the amount of
$143,989.00 as well as consequential damages in the amount of $120,000.00. [See
Second Special Verdict Form, R. 2554-2562].

21.
~

After the trial, KTM delivered a proposed judgment document that included an
award of prejudgment interest at the Contract's stated rate of 1.5% in the total
additional amount of $339,961.00. KTM's inclusion of prejudgment interest was
based on paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a) and (c) of the Contract.

22.

Appellants objected to KTM's inclusion of prejudgment interest on the grounds
that the prejudgment interest penalty only applied to situations where KTM would
have actually provided prescription drugs/supplies and supplied invoices to Kolob
(a situation that never arose due to the fact that the breach of contract occurred
prior to KTM supplying anything to Kolob). [R. 2702-2726].

Page 9 of 61
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23.

KTM countered that it had obtained a judgment for "lost profits." Because that
sum had been identified, Kolob and Apex were required to pay interest on that
amount at the rate of 1.5% as mandated by the Contract. KTM also argued that
Utah Code Ann. § I 5- 1-1 (2) allows for a I 0% per annum interest rate unless the
contract specifies a different specific rate of interest. [R. 3899-3912].

24.

Appellants responded that prejudgment interest may only be awarded in Utah
"where the loss is fixed as of a particular time and the amount of the loss can be
calculated with mathematical accuracy." Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co., 660 P.2d
229, 233 (Utah 1983). Additionally, Appellants argued that Utah law recognizes a
distinction between interest specifically stated in a contract before the contract is
breached and interest that is recoverable by way of damage after a breach. The
appropriate interest rate is the 10% statutory interest provided for by Utah Code
Ann. § 15-1-1(2). [R. 3930-3934]. Under this approach, the total judgment
including prejudgment interest is $363,081.37.

25.

On February I 0, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the matter and determined
that KTM was not entitled to any prejudgment interest (despite the fact that Kolob
Gv

and Apex had previously admitted that KTM was entitled to statutory prejudgment
interest). [February 10, 2016 Minute Entry, pp. I 6-19, attached as Addendum 2].
In reaching this decision, the trial court relied on Shoreline Dev. v. Utah County,
835 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Even though the jury had awarded a set
amount of damages based upon the specific terms of the one-year Contract, the
trial court found that the jury's award of damages was based on "best judgment"
Page 10of61
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as opposed to "fixed standards of valuation." As a result, the trial court declined to
award prejudgment interest.
Inconsistent Jury Verdict and Consequential Damages
26.

The district court conducted a trial in this matter on October 27-30, 2014, during
which a jury heard KTM's claim for breach of contract against defendants Kolob
and Apex. [R. 3895-3898].

27.

Jury instructions were read to the jury prior to closing arguments. [R. 3898,
263: 17-281: l].

28.

At the conclusion of the parties' closing arguments, the trial court provided the
jury with the Special Verdict Form to answer in deliberations. [R. 2545-2553].

29.

The jury completed its Special Verdict Form and announced that it had reached a
verdict on the parties' claims and defenses. [R. 3898, 321: 18-322:5].

30.
~

As to the breach of contract claim formation and breach, the jury found that Kolob
had entered into and then breached the Contract and had also breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. [R. 3898, 323:6-17; R. 2545-2553].

31.

At the same time, the jury found that Kolob and KTM relied upon the assumption
or fact that Kolob could terminate its contract with SCP, and that at the time the
Contract was formed between KTM and Kolob, both KTM and Kolob were
mistaken regarding Kolob's ability to terminate the Contract. [R. 3898, 323:18324:9; R. 2545-2553].

Cj)

32.

The jury then found that KTM had suffered lost profits in the amount of
$143,989.00, and awarded that amount to KTM. The jury also wrote in into the
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verdict form, "plus attorney fees." [R. 3898, 322: I 0-17, 324: 16-325: 12; R. 25452553].
33.

After the jury's verdict was announced, the trial court noted and explained
inconsistencies in the jury's verdict and asked them to return to deliberations. [R.
3898, 326:2-7].

34.

First, the trial court noted that it was inconsistent for the jury to find both a breach
of the contract (resulting in an award of damages and attorney's fees) and mutual
mistake. [R. 3898, 326:8-12].

35.

The trial court explained that mutual mistake is an affirmative defense to a claim
for breach of contract and that if there was a mutual mistake, then there was no
contract, and if there was no contract, damages could not be awarded. [R. 3898,
326:8-14].

36.

The trial court determined that it was necessary for the jury to return to their
deliberations to consider and decide if there had been clear and convincing
evidence that there was a mutual mistake; if the jury did find that there was a
mutual mistake, the jury could not find a contract or award damages. [R. 3898,
326: 14-19].

37.

The court also addressed the portion of the jury's verdict regarding an award of
"attorney's fees" and explained that attorney's fees could only be awarded on a
contractual or statutory basis. Because there was no applicable statutory or
contractual provision to support an award of attorney's fees, the verdict granting
such fees was not appropriate [R. 3898, 326: 19-327:4].
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~

38.

The trial court then sent the jury back to deliberate and fill out the Second Special
Verdict Form (which was identical to the initial Special Verdict Form). [R.

'1D

3898:327:5-330:5; R. 2554-2562].
39.

Before the jury was sent back to deliberate, the trial court clarified to the jury that,
while "not asking [them] to change [their] mind" on the issue, if they found that
there was a mutual mistake, they "really shouldn't go further" and should sign the
jury form without damages or making a finding on vicarious liability. [R. 3898,
327:7-20].

40.

The jury returned with the Second Special Verdict in which they reversed the prior
finding on Kolob's affirmative defense of mutual mistake and instead found no
mutual mistake. [R. 2556].

41.

The Second Special Verdict reconfirmed damages for lost profits in the amount of
$143,989.00 in favor of KTM. The award of attorney's fees was removed as
instructed previously by the trial court, but in their new verdict, the jury awarded
consequential damages in the amount of $ I 20,000.00 making the total damage
award $263,989.00. [R. 3898, 333: 1-14].

42.

Ultimately, the trial court upheld the jury's Second Special Verdict Form in its
entirety over the objections raised by counsel for Kolob and Apex, and final
judgment was entered by the court on March 25, 2016. [R. 3966-3968].

43.

On November 20, 2014, prior to the entry of final judgment, Kolob and Apex
moved the trial court to reconsider its decision that the jury's first special verdict
form was inconsistent. [R. 2569]. The trial court ultimately denied this motion. [R.
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at 2698]. The trial court subsequently issued a final judgment on March 25, 2016.
~

[R. at 3966].
44.

On April 8, 2016, Appellants moved the district court for a new trial pursuant to
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6). [R. 3971]. Kolob and Apex argued that
there was insufficient evidence to support the $120,000.00 consequential damages
award contained in the jury's Second Special Verdict Form. The district court
denied Appellants' motion for new trial on May 31, 2016. [R. 4091].

VI.

~

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A.

Background

1.

Adam Katschke ("Mr. Katschke") is a licensed pharmacist who has worked at and
operated pharmacies since 2000. [R. 3896, 114: 12-22].
®;

2.

In August 2009, Mr. Katschke and his business partner, Lane Truman ("Mr.
Truman"), formed KTM Healthcare Solutions, Inc. ("KTM"). [R. 3896, 117:2125].

3.

KTM opened a retail pharmacy in Enterprise, Utah, known as Enterprise Valley
Pharmacy ("Enterprise Valley"). [R. 3896, 117:21-118: 1].

4.

At the time KTM was formed, Mr. Katschke also owned and operated another
retail pharmacy in Caliente, Nevada, known as Meadow Valley Pharmacy
("Meadow Valley"). [R. 3896, 116: 15-117: 19].

5.

KTM and Meadow Valley are entirely separate entities that have separate
organizational documents and tax ID numbers, and they maintain separate
accounting books and records. [R. 3896, 223: 16-224: I I]
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6.

KTM and Meadow Valley do not have identical ownership. Mr. Katschke is the
sole owner of Meadow Valley. KTM is co-owned by Mr. Katschke and Mr.
Truman. [R. 3896, 224: 15-20]

7.

KTM was started as a "closed-door" pharmacy. [R. 3896, 123:11-124:2]

8.

A closed-door pharmacy is significantly different than a retail pharmacy because it

cw

is not open to the general public. Rather, a closed-door pharmacy provides
services to a defined and exclusive group of patients, such as long-term care
facilities, skilled nursing facilities and assisted living communities. [R. 3896,
119:1-9].

~

9.

The advantage of operating a closed-door pharmacy is that the pharmacy receives
certain manufacturer rebates that are not available to retail pharmacies. Per federal
regulations, a closed-door pharmacy is also entitled to charge insurance companies
a higher dispensing fee for its services. [R. 3896, 119: 10-120:3].

4.J}

B.

Negotiations Between Kolob and KTM.

I.

Kolob is a skilled nursing facility located in St. George, Utah. [R. 0294 ].

2.

Kolob provides short term and long term rehabilitation including recovery,

~

palliative care, and memory care. [R. 0294].
3.
~

Kolob requires and makes use of pharmaceutical products and services on a daily
basis in order to provide care for its residents. [R. 0294].

4.

Apex is a management company whose employees had supervisory authority over
Kolob and its operations. [R.3895, 238: 16-240:20].
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5.

In or about December 2009, KTM contacted Kolob to see whether Kolob would
consider contracting with KTM to provide Kolob with its pharmaceutical needs.

i'J

[R. 2896, 123: 19-25].
6.

At the time of initial contact, Kolob was already under contract with another
closed-door pharmacy, SCP, to fill its residents' prescriptions. [R. 3895, Tr.
Exhibit 23; 3896, 45: 15-19].

7.

However, Kolob was experiencing service issues with SCP. [R. 3895, Tr. Exhibit
23; 3896, 48:8-10].

8.

After Kolob expressed interest in using KTM's services, Mr. Katschke called Greg
Seeger ("Mr. Seeger"), the regional manager for Kolob. [R. 3896, 124: 15-125:7].

9.

During that phone call, Mr. Seeger, with "a lot of excitement in his voice" told Mr.
Katschke that Kolob had been looking for something because they were "very
unhappy with the service [they were] receiving [from SCP]" and asked to schedule
a meeting. [R. 3896, 124:23- 125 :7].

10.

In January 2010, Mr. Katschke met with Kolob's administrator, Jerry Olson ("Mr.
Olson"), the "director of nursing" Bess Litton ("Ms. Litton"), and Mr. Seeger. [R.
3896, 125:3-18].

11.

During this meeting, Kolob expressed "great" interest and eventually told Mr.
Katschke: "you put something together, we would like to see it, we would like to
work with you." [R. 3896, 125: 19-126:6].
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~

12.

On March 23, 20 I 0, Mr. Katschke again met with Mr. Olson and Mr. Seeger to
discuss the possibility of Kolob contracting for KTM's services. [R. 3896, 126:22-

@

23].
13.

During this meeting, Mr. Olson and Mr. Seeger represented that they were
unhappy with SCP's services. Specifically, they stated the SCP pharmacist had
yelled at some of Kolob's nurses and that they were experiencing other problems
with SCP as well. [R. 3896, 127:9-16].

14.

Mr. Olson and Mr. Seeger told Mr. Katschke "we are ready to use your services"
and"[ w ]e know you'll be a great service." [R. 3896, 127: 12-19].

15.

However, Mr. Olson and Mr. Seeger wanted to be assured that Mr. Katschke
would be the actual pharmacist in charge of servicing Kolob, as opposed to some
other employee. Mr. Olson and Mr. Seeger specifically told Mr. Katschke that the
"one little issue" they had was "that you're the guy, Adam" and "[w]e want you

~

there". [R. 3896, 127:16-19, 131:7-13].
16.

In response, Mr. Katschke promised that he would personally work at the KTM
pharmacy in order to service Kolob's residents, and told them that he would need

to hire another pharmacist to replace him at Meadow Valley as he was the only
pharmacist there at the time and that he was not personally working at the KTM
pharmacy. [R. 3896, 127:20-25, 131 :7-13].
17.

No contract between Kolob and KTM was actually signed during the
aforementioned March 23, 20 IO meeting. [R. 3896, 130:5-12].
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18.

Rather, Kolob asked KTM to draw up a contract and to provide Kolob with some
"proofs" to review. [R. 3896, 130:5-12].

19.

Mr. Katschke then took a tour of Kolob's facility with Mr. Seeger and Mr. Olson
in attendance. At the conclusion of the tour, the parties "congratulated each other
that [they] were going to start a new venture." [R. 3896, 130:13-21].

20.

Following the March 23, 2010 meeting, Mr. Seeger called Mr. Katschke to let him
know that Mr. Katschke would be receiving some proposals so that Kolob could
evaluate whether KTM offered better pricing/service than SCP. [R. 3896, 273: 1322].

21.

Also following the March 23, 2010 meeting, Mr. Katschke engaged in
negotiations with a pharmacist named Trent Decker ("Mr. Decker") to replace him
at the Meadow Valley pharmacy. Mr. Decker requested a five-year employment
contract. After negotiations, Mr. Decker settled on a three-year employment
contract. [R. 3896, 134:13-21, 137:6-25].

22.

Subsequently, on April 17, 2010, Meadow Valley signed the three-year
employment contract with Mr. Decker, which included a $120,000 annual salary
~

plus benefits such as extra paid vacation. [R. 3896, 135: 12-17, Tr. Exhibit 84,
I 36:7-19].
23.

Mr. Katschke would not have hired Mr. Decker to be an employee of Meadow
Valley had he not started KTM. [R. 3896, 139:20-22]. In fact, Mr. Katschke hired
Mr. Decker because he "made a promise to Jerry" that he would be the pharmacist
to personally take care of Kolob. [R. 3896, 140: 13-141 :2).
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24.

Mr. Decker's employment contract with Meadow Valley does not mention KTM
and Mr. Decker never did any work for KTM. [R. 3896, 277:4-288: 11].

@

25.

On April 15, 2010, Mr. Seeger sent an email to Mr. Katschke that contained a
proposal from Don Eads ("Mr. Eads") at SCP. [R. 3896, 272: 19-24; Tr. Exhibit
43].

26.

By that time KTM and Kolob already had a verbal agreement to do business
together. [R. 3896, 271: 16-21, 274:3-9].

27.

Based on his discussion with Mr. Seeger and Mr. Olson, Mr. Katschke understood
that Kolob had terminated (or at least could terminate) the agreement with SCP
and that the service agreement between KTM and Kolob could go into effect by
the previously negotiated date of June 28, 2010. [R. 3897, 6:19-7:2].

28.

Mr. Katschke expressly asked Mr. Olson and Mr. Seeger to allow him a couple of
months to get the proof of a contract ready because he and KTM needed time to
become licensed and ready to operate as a closed-door pharmacy. [R. 3896,
141:11-142:18].

29.

In order to become ready as a closed-door pharmacy, KTM needed to incur certain
expenses to comply with both state and federal regulations, including for instance
installing new shelving, countertops, alarm system, and refrigeration equipment;
purchasing a new computer and software system; and other costs related to
licensing, training, and third-party insurance contracting. [R. 3896, 185:8-187:23;
Tr. Exhibit 34].
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30.

The total for the costs outlined above, which were necessary for KTM to be able to
perform its part of the Contract, was $33,302.54. [R. 3896, 187:24-25; Tr. Exhibit

~

34].
31.

The majority of these costs were incurred by KTM between January and April
2010, with the computers being purchased in early May 2010, prior to the
execution of the Contract with Kolob, but following the January 2010 meeting in
which Kolob told Mr. Katschke that they "wanted to pursue working" with KTM.
[R. 3896, 226:24-227:7; Tr. Exhibit 34; 227:8-18].

32.

Mr. Seeger testified that after Kolob's meeting with KTM on March 23, 2010, he

r;;.,

~

reviewed Kolob's contract with SCP including the termination clause and spoke
with the local SCP representative to verify the correct date that Kolob could
terminate services with SCP and transition to KTM. [R. 3896, 49:7-20].
33.

Based on this information, Mr. Olson testified that he and Mr. Seeger were under
the impression that Kolob was on a month-to-month contract with SCP which

~

could be terminated with 30-days notice. [R. 3895, 136:3-13].
34.

On May 25, 2010, Mr. Katschke met with Mr. Olson and Ms. Litton at Mr.
Olson's office at Kolob's facility. Mr. Seeger participated via telephone. [R. 3896,
146:3-16].

35.

Mr. Olson indicated that Kolob wanted to make a few minor changes to the
proposed contract. Mr. Katschke made those changes on his laptop during the
meeting and printed out the Contract between KTM and Kolob. The final Contract
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~

was faxed to Mr. Seeger for signature on behalf of Kolob. [R. 3896, 146: 19~

147:4].
36.

Mr. Seeger signed the Contract on behalf of Kolob and emailed and faxed it back
so Mr. Katschke could sign it on behalf of KTM. [R. 3896, 147 :4-7].

37.

Paragraph one of the Contract indicates that the initial service date is June 28,
2010. [R. 3896, 50: 13-17; Tr. Exhibit 1].

38.

Mr. Seeger testified that this start-date was chosen to allow Kolob at least thirtydays to notify SCP of Kolob's decision to cancel its existing pharmaceutical
contract. [R. 3896, p. 50).

@
'

C.

Post-Contract Developments

I.

On the same day that KTM and Kolob signed the Contract (May 25, 2010), Mr.

~

Olson contacted SCP's local manager, Steve Woods ("Mr. Woods"), to let him
know that Kolob would no longer be using SCP for its pharmaceutical needs. [R.
3895, 131 :23-132:6].
2.

Mr. Woods responded by stating that Kolob's contract was still in effect. [R. 3895,
I 32:9-10].

3.

Later on May 25, 2010, Mr. Olson sent an email to Mr. Katschke stating that he
disagreed with Ko lob's interpretation of their contract and that Ko lob was "locked
in for 5 more months." Mr. Olson indicated that Kolob disagreed with SCP's
interpretation and that Kolob should be able to give a 30-days notice as originally
planned. [R. 3895, 134: 11; Tr. Exhibit 2].
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4.

Mr. Seeger also contacted Mr. Katschke and explained the situation to Mr.
Katschke and told him that Kolob wanted to begin service with KTM as soon as
Kolob could terminate its current contract with SCP . [R. 3896, 50:21-51 :8].

5.

On June 7, 2010, Mr. Olson sent another email to Mr. Katschke indicating
"apparently we are not going to be able to get out of our contract with Omni [i.e.
SCP] until the end of October". [R. 3895, 151: 17; Tr. Exhibit 4].

6.

When asked at trial to read the November 1, 2007 contract between Kolob and
SCP, Mr. Olson testified that he understood that the Kolob/SCP contract was to
continue through October 31, 2009 and then would be automatically renewed for

additional one-year periods unless either party notified the other in writing no less
than 120 days prior to the expiration of the initial term. [R. 3895, 165:11-166:11].
7.

When asked at trial if a notice of non-renewal was sent to SCP prior to the initial
term's conclusion, Mr. Olson responded "[n]ot to my knowledge." Mr. Olson also
stated that his understanding was that Kolob's contract with SCP had been
automatically extended for another one-year period, thereby terminating on
October 31, 2010. [R. 3895, 166: 12-167 :2].

8.

Mr. Olson testified that, at the time of negotiations with Mr. Katschke, he believed
the Contract between Kolob and SCP had been previously terminated because of a
mutual agreement between Mr. Seeger and Mr. Eads. [R. 3895, 167:23-168:1].

9.

Contrary to Mr. Olson's testimony, Mr. Seeger testified that on June 24, 2010, Mr.
Olson, on behalf of Kolob, signed an entirely new contract with SCP. SCP

~

countersigned the contract on June 28, 2010. This new contract was executed only
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four days before the effective date of Kolob's Contract with KTM was to
commence. [R. 3896, 55: 13-19, Tr. Exhibit 81.
10.

On July 1, 2010, the new contract between SCP and Kolob became effective (only
two days after KTM's contract became effective). [R. 3895, 168:16-169:8, Tr.

(fib

Exhibit 8].
11.

At trial, counsel for KTM asked Mr. Olson: "So my question to you is, why did
you create a new contract [with SCP ] when your term was, a, autorenewing and,
b, wasn't going to expire for another five months-four months?" [R. 3895,
170:5-8].

12.

Mr. Olson testified that he did not know why he signed an entirely new contract
with SCP when the original contract term was not going to expire for another four
or five months and would auto-renew in any case. [R. 3895, 170:5-18].

13.
~

Neither Mr. Seeger nor Mr. Olson disclosed to Mr. Katschke that a new contract
had been signed between Kolob and SCP. In fact, Mr. Katschke was unaware that
Kolob and SCP had signed a second contract until discovery in this case.

14.

On July 11, 2010, Mr. Olson emailed Mr. Katschke notifying him that Kolob had
made the decision to "stick with SCP for at least another year". [R. 3895, 154:4;
Tr. Exhibit 5].

15.

On July 20, 2010, Mr. Katschke emailed Mr. Seeger with his concerns and told
him "[KTM is] willing to wait until the end of October if need be" but anything
beyond those three months was unreasonable and the appropriate compensation
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would need to be made if the Contract wasn't honored. [R. 3895, 159:21; Tr.
Exhibit 6].
16.

Kolob refused to honor the Contract and moved forward with SCP under their
newly negotiated contract.

VII.

A.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Appellee's Response to Appellants' Arguments
1.

The trial court properly allowed the jury to reconsider inconsistencies in the
jury verdict.

2.

The jury's award of consequential damages is supportable and should not
be overturned.

B.

Appellee's Arguments on Cross-Appeal
1.

The trial court abused its discretion by excluding the expert testimony of
Bryan Nichols, which testimony was related to the typical duration and
term of closed-door pharmaceutical agreements. Mr. Nichol's testimony

r::.:.,

~

was relevant, helpful and reliable and the jury (as trier of fact) should have
been allowed to hear and consider his expert testimony.
3.

KTM's fraud-based claims were improperly dismissed by the trial court.
Neither the economic loss rule nor the election of remedies doctrine bar
KTM's fraud-based claims in this case.

4.

The trial court improperly denied KTM statutory interest of 10% under
Utah Code Ann. § 15-15-1. Sufficient evidence and testimony were
presented at trial to establish that KTM's loss had been fixed as of a
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~

definite time and that the amount of the loss was calculated with
mathematical accuracy in accordance with well-established rules of
damages.

VIII.

APPELLEE'S RESPONSE TO ARGUMENTS ON DIRECT APPEAL

®

A.

The trial court correctly determined that the jury's initial special verdict
form was so inconsistent that it required the jury to reconvene and complete
a second special verdict form to correct the perceived inconsistency.
After trial in this case, the jury completed a Special Verdict Form. Of

relevance to Appellants' arguments and Appellee' s response on direct appeal are the
following Special Verdict Form findings:
(I)

Kol ob entered into a contract with KTM and breached both the Contract
and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. [R. 2546; 3898, 323:6-17];

(2)

Kolob's ability to terminate its contract with SCP was a basic assumption
or important fact upon which both KTM and Kolob had knowledge and
based their Contract and both KTM and Kolob were mistaken regarding
Kolob's ability to terminate its contract with SCP prior to the date of
performance of the Contract. [R. 2547; 3898, 323: I 8-324:9];

(3)

KTM suffered damages as a result of Kolob's breach of contract and breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the amount of $143,989.00
for lost profits; [R. 2549; 3898, 324: 16-20]

(4)

The total damages to be awarded to KTM are $143,989.00 for lost profits
plus attorney fees. [R. 2550; 3898, 325:2-12].
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After determining that the finding of mutual mistake was inconsistent with an
award of damages and finding that the award of attorney's fees was not supported by
contract or statute, the trial court correctly instructed the jury as follows:
Folks, perhaps because the verdict form was not plain enough, there are
inconsistencies here.

You have found that there's been a breach of the contract. An affirmative defense
to the breach of contract is mutual mistake, and you found that there was mutual
mistake. If there was a mutual mistake made, then there was no contract. It never
formed, and so you couldn't award damages. And rather than have this go up on
appeal with that instruction, I would like you to go back and consider if, in fact,
you found by clear and convincing evidence that there was mutual mistake based
on Questions 4 and 5, then you can't find a contract and find damages. As a matter
of fact, the only time attorney's fees can be awarded is if it's in the contract or if
there's a statute. There was no statute that would be involved, and if you read -and I'm sure that you did -- the contract did not have an attorney's fees clause. If
there had been one, we would have been arguing about it and about the amount.
And since it's not, your suggestion here plus attorney's fees is also I guess as a
matter of law I can't do that.

~

Do we have a -- Judy, can we get another special verdict form printed out quickly,
and I'll let you take this in with you. But my question to you is, on page 3 [of the
Special Verdict Form]-and I'm not asking you to change your -- your -- your
mind on this. If you found by clear and convincing evidence that there was a
mutual mistake, then you really shouldn't go further, and you sign the jury
verdict form without damages, and you don't need to have any sort of a finding
of vicarious liability. Perhaps on this one we should have said if you find mutual
mistake it said to proceed to Question No. 6. We should have said stop your
deliberations, sign the jury verdict form and return it. Does that make some sense
to you? Do we have a new one printed out?
~

We' re going to hand you a new one, and I'm going to give you this old one to
review. And we're going to -- when you leave we'll have some statement made on
the record. So let's all rise for the jury.
[R. 3898, 326:2-328:2]. (Emphasis added).
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After sending the jury back with the above-noted oral instructions, and a blank
Second Special Verdict Form, Mr. Guelker, attorney for Appellants entered the following
objection:
I would object to sending the jury back in the manner in which you did. It's
our position that once they found that there was a mutual mistake, any
further findings were irrelevant because once there's mutual mistake the
contract was unenforceable, and there should have been no damages. So
even despite the mistake on the verdict form, once they found mutual
mistake, that really ended the matter and everything leading after that is
really null and void. (Emphasis added).
[R. 3898, 328: I 0-20].

The jury returned with the completed Second Special Verdict Form. The
Second Special Verdict Form indicated the following findings:
(1)

Kolob entered into a contract with KTM and breached both the Contract
and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. [R. 2555].

(2)

Kolob's ability to terminate its contract with SCP was not a basic
assumption or important fact upon which both KTM and Kolob had
knowledge and based their Contract and KTM and Kolob were not
mistaken regarding Kolob's ability to terminate its contract with SCP prior
to the date of performance of the Contract. (ln other words, the jury
reversed the finding of mutual mistake). [R. 2556].

~

(3)

KTM suffered damages as a result of Kolob's breach of contract and breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the amount of $143,989.00
for lost profits [R. 2558].

Page 27 of 61

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(4)

KTM suffered additional

losses reasonably anticipated within the

contemplation of the parties in the amount of $120,000.00. [R. 2559].
(5)

The final award of damages was $143,989.00 in lost profit and $120,000.00
in consequential damages for a total award of $263,989.00.

1.

While a court must attempt to reconcile special verdicts if possible,
the trial court did not err in sending the jury back to reconsider the
first Special Verdict Form._

On appeal, Kolob and Apex have raised the same issues and cited the same cases

i)

referred to in their Motion to Reconsider after trial. [R. 2569-2589]. Appellants rely on
three key cases for their assertion that the trial court erred in sending the jury back to
reconcile their finding of mutual mistake and the award of damages and attorney's fees in
the first Special Verdict Form. Those cases are: Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr.

Co., 701 P.2d 1078; Tooele Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Tooele City, 2012 UT App
214, 284 P.3d 709; and Heno v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 208 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 2000).
As set forth hereinafter, the cases relied upon by Appellants are factually inapposite to
the case at bar and actually support KTM 's position.
In Bennion the defendants, on appeal, asserted that the jurors had answered
questionnaires with inconsistent verdicts. This Court determined that this was not the
case by simply looking at the wording of the questionnaires:
In answer to special interrogatories 5(a) and 5(b), the jury found that the
Bennions were negligent, but that their negligence was not a "proximate
cause" of their damages. In answer to interrogatory 7(b) the jury found that
Bennions' negligence was "a cause" of the Bennions' damages to the extent
of being 20% at fault. Johnson Construction argues that the answer to 5(a),
that Plaintiffs were negligent, is inconsistent with 5(b ), that their negligence
was not the proximate cause of the damage, and that the answer to 5(b ), that
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~

Plaintiffs negligence was not a proximate cause of the damage, is in
consistent to the answer to 7(b ), that plaintiff's negligence was a 20% cause
of the damage.

In our view, the answers to interrogatories S(a), 5(b) and 7(b) can, and
therefore must, be read harmoniously. Certainly there is no inconsistency
necessary or otherwise, between findings of negligence and no proximate
cause. (Internal citations omitted). Nor were the jury's answer to
interrogatory 5(b ), that Plaintiffs were not a proximate cause of the damage
inconsistent with the answer to 7(b ), that Plaintiffs were "a cause" of the
damage.
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d atl082-83.

In other words, the interrogatories the jury responded to were, in fact, compatible
and legally accurate. The Bennion court then stated:

Furthermore, Johnson Construction failed to object to the verdict before the
jury was discharged. When special interrogatories or verdicts are
ambiguous, counsel has an obligation either to object to the filing of the
verdict or move that the cause be resubmitted to the jury for clarification. If
a party fails to take appropriate action before the discharge of the verdict,
that party generally may not later move for a new trial on the ground that
the verdict was defective.

The rule requiring an objection if there is some ambiguity serves the
objective of avoiding the expense and additional time for a new trial by
having the jury which heard the facts clarify the ambiguity while it is
able to do so. (Emphasis added) (Internal citations omitted).
Bennion, at I 083.

At the time that the trial court sent the jury back to resolve the ambiguity in
the verdict, counsel for Appellants, Mr. Guelker, objected. However, in his own
objection, Mr. Guelker acknowledged the ''mistake in the verdict form."
328: I 0-20].
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[R. 3898,

Bennion mandates that once an inconsistency in a special interrogatory or verdicts
is discovered, it is an actual requirement that legal counsel object and request the matter
to be resubmitted to the jury for clarification. After reading the initial verdict form into
the record and identifying the inconsistency, the trial court requested that counsel
~

approach the bench. The trial court then asked counsel what they would like to do with
respect to the apparent ambiguity in the jury's verdict. [R. 3898, 325:22-327:20]. The
suggestion was made by KTM's counsel that the matter be sent back to the jury to resolve

~

the inconsistency. The trial court agreed with this suggestion and the jury was given a
Second Special Verdict form. However, before allowing the jury to leave, the trial court
gave the following instructions: ( 1) the jury had found a breach of the contract, (2)
mutual mistake is an affirmative defense to the breach of contract, (3) if there was mutual
mistake, no contract ever formed and so no award of damages could be given. [R. 3898,

326:8-14]. The trial court then stated: "[a]nd rather than have this go up on appeal with
that instruction, I would like you to go back and consider if, in fact, you found by clear
and convincing evidence that there was mutual mistake based on Questions 4 and 5, then
you can't find a contract and find damages." [R. 3898, 326: 14-19]. The trial court also
~

clearly indicated that it was not asking the jury to "change its mind"-but that if mutual
mistake was found, then the jury need go no further and the verdict form should be
signed without any damages. [R. 3898, 327 :7-14].
The trial court also explained that the jury could not award attorney's fees in the
case because there was no statutory or contractual basis for the fees. [R. 3898, 326: 19-

372:4]. The unexpected inclusion of attorney's fees by the jury was obviously intended to
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penalize Appellants. However, it presented a secondary ambiguity that the trial court
Gj

wished to clarify with the jury. It should be noted that the trial court's explanation to the
jury about the inappropriateness of attorney's fees was actually favorable to the
Appeilants.
Unlike Bennion (where the interrogatories were found to be consistent), there is no
possible way that damages and attorney's fees could be "awarded" in the instant case if a
mutual mistake was also found. Similarly, there could not be mutual mistake if damages
were awarded. Defendants attempt to gloss over this point by indicating the damage
award was "advisory." 6
Appellants' argument misses three specific points. First, the award of damages
would be inconsistent to the affirmative defense as explained. Second, it is an actual rule
that the sitting jury must have an opportunity to clarify any ambiguity. Third, the jury
initially award attorney's fees in addition to damages-something which would never be
warranted if the contract was void in the first place due to mutual mistake.
One of the fundamental flaws of Appellants' argument is that it requires this Court
to assume that the jury originally had no intention to award actual damages to KTM, but
that somehow, upon reconsideration, the jury completely reversed its position.
Appellant's also fail to realize that it was equally possible that the jury could have
eliminated the damage award and simply found mutual mistake after revisiting the initial
verdict-but the jury did not. It also bears repeating that the jury specifically found that a
6

Note that the damages in the Special Verdict Form are classified as an "award" and
were merely an empty "calculation" as suggested by Appellants. [R. 2550; 3898, 325:212].
Page >I of61

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

contract had been formed and that Appellants had breached both the Contract and the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The court in Tooele Associates offers the following guidance: "When reconciling
apparent inconsistencies on a special verdict form, 'the answers to the questions are to be

ti
construed in the context of the surrounding circumstances of the case and in connection
with the pleadings, instructions, and issues submitted."' Tooele Associates Ltd.

Partnership v. Tooele City, 2012 Ut. App 214,

Cj{

11 (internal citations omitted). In the

case at bar, the jury was given the opportunity to orally verify if the Second Special
Verdict rendered was their verdict. The jurors each made a unanimous statement in the
affirmative. [R. 3898, 333:24-335:6]. Given the rule that the jury should be allowed the
opportunity to clarify any apparent inconsistencies, and given the fact the jurors (to the
person) confirmed the same damage amount as well as additional consequential damages
in the Second Special Verdict Form it is clear that the jury intended to award KTM
damages.
The third case cited by Kolob and Apex in support of their argument that the trial
court erred in requiring the jury to clarify its verdict is Heno v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co.,
208 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 2000). Heno is actually helpful to KTM's position. In that case,
the Tenth Circuit Court addressed the issue of inconsistent verdicts and stated:
Sprint argues, however, that the inconsistent verdicts should be resolved by
granting judgment as a matter of law in its favor. It relies heavily upon the
First Circuit's decision in de Feliciano v. de Jesus, 873 F.2d 447 ( I st Cir.
1989) .... de Feliciano acknowledged a split in authority on this point, but
regardless, cases must be read against their facts and de Feliciano is
distinguishable. First, the court noted that "we cannot blame the district
courts' failure to send the jury back to reconsider any more on the
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defendants than on the plaintiffs" because the trial court raised the issue
itself and held that the verdicts were reconcilable. If Sprint had raised the
issue before the jury was dismissed, the inconsistent verdicts could
simply have been resolved by sending the matter back for clarification.
Heno, at 853. (Emphasis added).
Such guidance is both practical and reasonable. The Heno court advises that
inconsistent verdicts should simply be resolved by sending the matter back to the jury for
clarification. In the case at bar, the inconsistent verdicts were resolved by doing exactly
what the Heno court advised. The jury first returned with an apparent inconsistent
verdict. The trial court asked counsel what they would like to do. The suggestion was
made that the matter be sent back to the jury to resolve the apparent inconsistency. The
trial court agreed with this suggestion, and the jury was given the Second Verdict form
with the instructions that the jury must find either mutual mistake or damages-but not
both. Through this simple, direct, and efficient process, the jury resolved the apparent
inconsistency, judicial economy was preserved, and the rule of law was followed.

2.

It is inconsistent for the jury to find mutual mistake, but to also award
damages for breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and attorney's fees.

In their brief on appeal, Appellants argue that the determination of mutual mistake
was not inconsistent with an award of damages (and attorney's fees) because the award of
damages for "breach of contract" does not address whether the contract itself is void due
to mutual mistake. Appellants' argument is flawed for the following reasons:
I.

Counsel for Appellants admitted that the Special Verdict Form included a
Hmistake." This mistake was the failure of the verdict form to properly
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guide the jury in understanding that a finding of mutual mistake would
necessarily void the Contract and prohibit an award of damages. This
mistake is something that the trial court clearly clarified before sending the
jury back to reconsider the verdict;
2.

The jury awarded attorney's fees to KTM even though there was no line in
the Special Verdict Form for such an award;

3.

The jury found both breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing;

4.

When the jury returned with the Second Special Verdict Form, the jury
awarded the same lost profit damage amount, but also added an additional
$120,000.00-thereby clearly indicating the jury's view of Appellants'
~

actions.
Appellants rely on Neff v. Neff, 2011 UT 6, 247 P.3d 380 for the general
proposition that a jury verdict that is inconsistent on its face should be "read
harmoniously" so that "any reasonable view of the case makes the jury's answer
consistent. Appellee does not dispute these legal guidelines. However, it is important to
note that Neff involved a case where the trial court granted a JNOV motion that reversed
the jury's verdict as to a finding of slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty. On
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it overturned the
jury verdict on slander of title, but did not err on overturning the jury verdict on breach of
fiduciary duty. Id., ~[~[ 75-86. Clearly, the Neff case is both procedurally and factually

~

different than the case at bar. In the instant case, none of the parties made a JNOV motion
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~

m an effort to reverse the jury's verdict. On the contrary, the jury was allowed to
reconsider the inconsistencies m the initial Special Verdict Form after the trial court
clearly explained the role of mutual mistake vis-a-vis a finding of breach of contract and
award of damages and attorney's fees.
Appellants also insist that the trial court should have merely excused the jury and
then independently determined as a matter law that the jury had no intent to award actual
damages due to the finding of mutual mistake. Ostensibly, the trial court could have
attempted such a fiat. Instead, however, the trial court exercised appropriate care and
allowed the jury to clarify exactly what it intended-and the Second Special Verdict
Form clearly demonstrates exactly what the jury intended as far as compensating KTM
for Appellants' actions.

B.

The trial court properly denied Appellants' Motion for New Trial.
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 59, a trial judge may grant a new trial where there is an

"[i]nsufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision." Utah R. Civ. P.
59(a)(6). "If the trial court can reasonably conclude that there was insufficient evidence
to justify the verdict," then an order granting a new trial is appropriate. Crookston v. Fire

Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 804 (Utah I 991 ).
A trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) will be only
be reversed if the reviewing court "concludes that the evidence, when viewed most
favorably for the prevailing party, is insufficient to support the verdict." Tingey v.

Christensen, 1999 UT 68, qr 7, 987 P.2d 588. Appellants also have the burden of
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marshaling the evidence in support of the verdict and showing that the evidence, viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict, is insufficient. Id.
First, Appellants have failed to properly marshal the evidence in favor of the jury's
finding for consequential damages. Even under the modified standard articulated by in

State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645, an appellant is still required to marshal
sufficient evidence to support the verdict that appellant is challenging or else risk failing
to carry its burden of persuasion.
Furthermore, the $120,000.00 presented as a consequential damage correlates
exactly to the number offered by Mr. Katschke as the yearly amount paid to hire Mr.
Decker-his replacement at Meadow Valley. [R. 3896, 204: 10-16]. As part of the terms
of their agreement, Mr. Olson and Mr. Seeger demanded that Mr. Katschke serve as the

actual pharmacist in charge of servicing Kolob, as opposed to some other employee. Mr.
Olson and Mr. Seeger specifically told Mr. Katschke that the "one little issue" they had
was "that you're the guy, Adam" and "[w]e want you there". [R. 3896, 127:16-19, 131:7In response, Mr. Katschke promised that he would personally work at the KTM
pharmacy in order to service Kolob's residents. Mr. Katschke directly notified Mr. Olson
and Mr. Seeger that he would need to hire another pharmacist to replace him at Meadow

Valley as he was the only pharmacist there at the time and that he was not personally
working at the KTM pharmacy. [R. 3896, 127:20-25, 131 :7-13].
Furthermore, KTM incurred costs related to construction, computers, an alarm
system, state and federal licensing costs, books and employee training. [R. at 3896,
186: 1-187: 18, Tr. Exhibit 34 ]. These costs were incurred as a direct consequence of the
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negotiations of the parties. During negotiations, Appellants were fully aware that
Appellee was not in a position to service their pharmaceutical needs, so Appellants
requested that Appellee prepare to accommodate the agreement between the parties by
transitioning from an open to a closed-door pharmacy. [R. 3896, 139: 1-141 :25].
Legal damages serve the important purpose of compensating an injured party for
actual injury sustained, so that she may be restored, as nearly as possible, to the position
she was in prior to the injury." Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 939 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997). A court may award consequential damages when the non-breaching party
~

proves: "(I) that consequential damages were caused by the contract breach; (2) that
consequential damages ought to be allowed because they were foreseeable at the time the
parties contracted; and (3) the amount of consequential damages within a reasonable
certainty." Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT I 04, err 20, 990 P.2d 933. Each of these elements
is met in the instant case.
Furthermore, when determining whether evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding
by a jury, the jury is generally allowed wide discretion in the assessment of damages.

Comia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Utah 1995). A new trial is appropriate only "[iJf
~

the trial court can reasonably conclude that there was insufficient evidence to justify the
verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d at 804. KTM presented evidence
showing it incurred costs in changing its facility status by: obtaining computers
compatible with the new system, administering extensive in-state and out-of-state
employee training, obtaining licensing fees. spending considerable time preparing to
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properly administer Contract, and replacing Mr. Katschke with Mr. Decker as required by
Kolob.

©

IX.
A.

APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS ON CROSS-APPEAL

The trial court erred in excluding testimony from Appellee's expert, Bryan
Nichols.
Appellants made a motion to strike the expert testimony of one of Appellee 's
7

experts, Brian Nichols. Bryan Nichols is a specialist in geropharmacology and geriatric
care who provides consulting services for skilled nursing facilities. [R. 0428]. Appellee
hired Mr. Nichols to (among other things) provide testimony in an expert capacity
concerning the industry standard duration of most closed door pharmaceutical
agreements. One of the primary issues in question was whether Appellee was entitled to
damages from Appellants' breach of the Contract for only the one-year period explicitly
set forth in the Contract, or whether Appellee was entitled to expect damages for the
additional renewal periods that were contemplated by the Contract. Mr. Nichols was
expected to testify that such closed-door pharmaceutical agreements like the Contract at

issue in the instant lawsuit are almost always one-year contracts with auto-renewal
clauses that are honored by the parties. [R. 0430-0432].
Ultimately, the trial court ruled that Utah R. Evid. 702 requires the trial court to
"first exercise its 'gatekeeper' responsibility and examine the proposed expert testimony
to ascertain whether the testimony's subject matter is sufficiently tied to the facts of the

7

See Appellants' Motion to Strike KTM Health Care's Proposed Expert Testimony and
Memorandum in Support. [R.0347-0389]. See also, Appellee's Memorandum in
Opposition [R. 0427-0438] and Appellants' Reply Memorandum [R. 0441-0448].
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case before the Court" (internal citations omitted). [R. 1034]. After noting this
responsibility the trial court determined:
. . . there are not sufficient facts in this case to support the proposed
testimony of KTM's expert, Bryan Nichols, that Kolob would have
renewed its pharmacy provider agreement with KTM for at least six years
had Kolob begun using KTM for its pharmaceutical needs in 20 I 0.
Therefore, such testimony is not relevant because it would not help the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue in this
case. [R. 1034].
Utah courts are granted broad discretion in fulfilling their "gatekeeping" duty,
which serves to ensure that only reliable expert testimony is presented to a jury. See

Gunn Hill Dairy Props. LLC v. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power, 2012 UT App 20, 9I
31, 269 P.3d 980, 991.
Utah R. Evid. 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony and provides:
(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), a witness who is qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may
testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
(b)
Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the
basis for expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the
principles or methods that are underlying in the testimony
(I) are reliable,
(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts.
(c)
The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the
underlying principles or methods, including the sufficiency of facts or data
and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally
accepted by the relevant expert community.
KTM asserts on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Mr.
Nichols' expert testimony concerning the typical duration and term of closed-door
pharmaceutical agreements. Under the abuse of discretion standard, Appellee must
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establish that the trial court's decision to exclude the testimony "exceeds the limits of
reasonability." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted).
Mr. Nichols' expert testimony was relevant inasmuch as it would have
helped the trier of fact (the jury) to understand the evidence and determine
facts.
Appellants moved to strike the opm10n of Mr. Nichols on grounds that Mr.
Nichols' opinion did not meet Rule 702's standard of relevance. [R. 0350-0389]. Rule
702 requires that expert testimony "help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue." In the instant case, the initial question for the trial court to
determine was whether Mr. Nichols' testimony would have helped the jury understand
any provision of Contract
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that a determination of helpfulness under
Rule 702 involves consideration of "whether the subject is within the knowledge or
experience of the average individual." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361 (citing Dixon v.
Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982)). "It is not necessary that the subject of the

testimony be so erudite or arcane that the jurors could not possibly understand it without
the aid of expert testimony, nor is it a requirement that the subject be beyond the
comprehension of each and every juror." Id.

In Larsen, the Supreme Court upheld

admission of expert testimony regarding whether certain information omitted from
securities documents was material, finding that "'the technical nature of securities is not
within the knowledge of the average layman or a subject within the common experience
and would help the jury understand the issues before them."'

Id. (quoting State v.

Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 492-93 (Utah App. 1992)).
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~

~

Utah R. Evid. 40 I provides that "[ e ]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency
to make a fact more or less probable that it would be without the evidence; and (b) the
fact is of consequence in determining the action." Furthermore, "evidence that has even
the slightest probative value is relevant under the definition in rule 40 l ." State v. Jaeger,
1999 UT 1,

9I 12, 973 P.2d 404. (Emphasis added; citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).
Appellants argued to the trial court that Mr. Nichols' testimony was not helpful to
the trier of fact because Mr. Nichols' testimony bore no relevance to the case at bar. [R.
0356-0358]. However, Appellee's Complaint sought expectation damages for lost profits
due to Appellant's breach of the parties' Contract. Mr. Nichols' export report contains
his opinion regarding the industry standard for the duration of closed door pharmaceutical
agreements. In other words, Mr. Nichols' testimony is highly relevant as to one of the
primary issues in this case and is highly valuable to the trier of fact in determining the
number of years for which KTM could have recovered damages under the Agreement.
Like the securities documents in Larsen, the technical nature of closed door
pharmaceutical agreement is not within the knowledge of the average layman or a subject
within the common experience. Consistent with the relevance definition in Rule 40 I, Mr.
Nichols' testimony would have had a tendency to make KTM's position on the duration
of the Agreement more likely, and the duration of the Agreement was "of consequence in
determining" damages in this case.
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2.

Mr. Nichol's expert opinion met the threshold standard of reliability and
should have been admitted as expert testimony.

This Court has previously stated that Rule 702(b) reqmres "only a basic
foundational showing of indicia of reliability for the testimony to be admissible, not that

the opinion is indisputably correct." Gunn Hill Dairy Props., LLC v. L.A. Dep 't of Water

& Power, 2012 UT App 20, ~I 33, 269 P.3d 980 (emphasis in original) (quoting Utah R.
Evid. 702 advisory committee note).

Additionally, "a trial court's consideration of

whether expert testimony satisfies a threshold showing of reliability marks only the
beginning of a reliability determination," properly leaving the determination of the

ultimate reliability of the expert testimony as a matter for the trier of fact. Id. at

CJ{

33

(emphasis in original).
The requirements to establish a threshold showing of reliability for the purposes of
Rule 702(b) varies depending on the complexity of the case. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp.
and Med. Ctr., 2010 UT 59, ell 15, 242 P.3d 762. Cases that do not require complex

expert testimony carry a low threshold of reliability. Gunn Hill Dairy Props., LLC v.
L.A. Dep 't of Water & Power, 2012 UT App 20, en 32. As indicated in Rule 702(c), the

required threshold showing is satisfied "if the underlying principles or methods, including
the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the case,
are generally accepted by the relevant expert community," and the Utah Supreme Court
has found that expert testimony regarding personal experience within an industry and
dealing with situations similar to the one at issue constitutes a threshold showing of
reliability. See Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 2010 UT 59, en 15.

Page 42 of 61

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mr. Nichols' expert opinion was based, not on assumptions or speculation, but
rather on his extensive personal experience in the closed door pharmacy industry. As
detailed in his expert report, Mr. Nichols has been a pharmacist for more than 20 years
and has personally been involved with the formation of six independent closed door
pharmacies in the State of Utah. [R. 0432]. Mr. Nichols has specialized in
geropharmacology and geriatric care and has been employed as a consultant for nine
skilled nursing facilities. Mr. Nichols is also an adjunct professor at the University of
Utah College of Pharmacy and the Roseman College of Pharmacy where he teaches
students about industry standards for closed door pharmacy practice. [R. 0432].
In seeking to have Mr. Nichols' testimony excluded, Appellants argued to the trial
court that it is "undisputed" that the Contract was only for a single year period. [R. 03510354]. While the Contract does indicate an initial period of one year, it also contains two
renewal provisions-one of which is an auto-renewal provision providing: "When the
initial term ends, this term shall renew automatically for successive periods of one year
each." [R. 035 I]. [See Facility Agreement with Provider Pharmacy ("Contract"),

~

6,

attached as Addendum I].
The very purpose of Mr. Nichols' testimony was to provide support for KTM's
claim that industry contracts between pharmacy providers and facilities, by their very
nature are necessarily long-term due to the cost and expenses incurred by both parties in
preparing for such a business relationship. Mr. Nichols' personal experience as a
pharmacist for closed door pharmacies, and dealing with closed door pharmaceutical
agreements in the long-term care industry, constitutes a threshold showing of reliability
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for purposes of Rule 702(b) and, therefore, Mr. Nichols' expert testimony should have
been allowed so that the jury could hear his testimony and make a determination as to its
viability and persuasiveness.
3.

The determination of reliability of expert testimony is not an issue of
admissibility. but a matter of "weight" to be determined by the trier of fact.

~

The trial court's decision to exclude the testimony of Mr. Nichols was based on a
finding that Mr. Nichols' testimony was not relevant because "it would not help the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue in this case." [R. 1034].
In other words, the trial court made a determination on the ultimate reliability of the
expert opinion-a matter that is properly left to the trier of fact (i.e. the jury). "'It is not
the role of the trial court to evaluate the correctness of facts underlying one expert's
testimony."' Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 2010 UT 59 at ~I 16 (quoting Micro
Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1392 (Fed.Cir. 2003)). The Utah Supreme
Court has acknowledged that "an expert can rely on his own interpretation of facts that
have a foundation in the evidence, even if those facts are in dispute." Id. (citing Yowell v.
Occidental Life Ins. Co., 110 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 1941)). Additionally, an expert witness
may base his testimony on '"reports, writings[,] or observations not in evidence which
were made or compiled by others, so long as they are of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in that particular field."' Balderas v. Starks, 2006 UT App 218, ~[ 29, 138 P.3d 75
(quoting State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982)). A party wishing to challenge
the reliability of such materials may do so on cross-examination, "but such challenge
goes to the weight to be given the testimony, not to its admissibility." Id.
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(t)

The trial court could not properly exclude Mr. Nichols' testimony merely because
Appellants did not agree with Mr. Nichols' testimony-such a challenge is a challenge to
the weight to be given the testimony, not to its admissibility. Appellants were entitled to
challenge Mr. Nichol's testimony on cross-examination at trial or to retain their own
expert witness to present rebuttal expert testimony.
4.

The trial court improperly excluded Mr. Nichol's expert testimony on a
motion to strike.

In order for the trial court to determine that Mr. Nichols' proposed testimony
should be excluded, the trial court would have had to first reach the threshold
determination that the Contract would not have continued beyond one year (had
Appellants not breached the Contract) and that KTM's damages were limited to one year
of profits. As a procedural matter, that determination was not before the trial court at the
time it ruled to exclude Mr. Nichols' testimony. The trial court's exclusion was based on
a "motion to strike" (not a motion for summary judgment) which was made several years
(jJ

before trial.
Because Appellants sought to exclude Mr. Nichols' testimony via a motion to
strike, the trial court was not procedurally in a position to make a dispositive ruling about
the ultimate duration of the Contract at issue. Factual disputes between the parties as to
~

the duration of the Contract should have prevented the Court from granting Appellants'
motion to strike. Furthermore, as previously noted, the Contract itself contained
conflicting prov1s10ns that rendered the Contract ambiguous-a fact that Appellants
admit to in their motion to strike. [R. 0351 ]. In the presence of such contractual
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ambiguity, the intent of the parties becomes a question for the trier of fact. See Plateau
Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990).

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should determine that the trial court abused
its discretion in preemptively excluding the testimony of KTM's expert, Mr. Bryan
Nichols.
B.

The trial court erred in determining that the economic loss rule and doctrine
of election of remedies required a dismissal of Appellee's fraud-based claims.

Appellee's Second Amended Complaint asserted three fraud-based claims against:
(I) fraud in the inducement, (2) constructive fraud, and (3) intentional misrepresentation.

[R. 0314-0319].
Initially, the Court affirmed that KTM could maintain its fraud and negligencebased claims. [R. 1768]. However, during the pretrial conference on June 5, 2014,
Appellants renewed their request that the Court exclude KTM's fraud claim pursuant to a
theory of election of remedies. [See Addendum 2].
Both parties provided additional briefing. [R. 2098-2104; 2122-2131]. After
additional briefing by the parties, the trial court issued a ruling on September 5, 2014,
dismissing KTM's fraud-based claims under an election of remedies analysis. The trial
court also noted that any post-contract tort claims based on the breach of contract were
precluded by the economic loss rule [See September 5, 2014 Minute Entry, Addendum
J_].

KTM filed a Motion to Reconsider the dismissal of the fraud-based claims arguing
that the economic loss doctrine did not bar common law fraud and misrepresentation
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claims that are based on independent duties. [R. 2263-2288]. Appellants opposed,
arguing that the trial court's dismissal of KTM's fraud claims was based primarily on the
doctrine of election of remedies, not on the economic loss rule. [R. 2339-2347].
KTM responded in its Reply that at the September 5, 2014 hearing, the trial
court's reliance on the election of remedies doctrine was limited to pre-contract torts.
Because KTM's allegations of fraudulent conduct were related to the period after the

Contract was executed, those torts were not precluded by the economic loss doctrine. [R.
2433].
On October 8, 2014, in ruling on the election of remedies question, the trial court
determined that as a result of KTM's fraudulent inducement claim, KTM was required to
either avoid the contract and seek damages (such as reliance and punitive damages) or
alternatively affirm the contract and seek breach of contract damages. The trial court
found that KTM had chosen to affirm the Contract and was therefore precluded by the
@I

doctrine of election of remedies and the economic loss rule from pursuing its remaining
tort claims (i.e. fraud in the inducement, constructive fraud, intentional misrepresentation
and negligent representation). The trial court dismissed all of those claims. [R. 23242326].
For purposes of this appeal, KTM only alleges error as to dismissal of the fraudbased claims. Because the fraud-based claims were dismissed via motion, the correctionof-error standard applies. Overstock. com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 2008 UT 55, <JI 12.
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1.

The doctrine of election of remedies should not bar KTM's fraud-based
claims.

KTM made clear to the trial court on several occasions that I was electing the
remedy of monetary damages and had no interest in seeking to void or rescind the
contract. [R. 1490, 2124]. The doctrine of election of remedies is a "technical rule of
procedure and its purpose is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double
redress for a single wrong. Said doctrine presupposes a choice between inconsistent

~

remedies, and knowledgeable selection of one thereof, free of fraud or imposition, and a
resort to the chosen remedy evincing a purpose to forego all others." Palmer v. Hayes,
892 P.2d I 059, 1061-62 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (internal quotation omitted).
Restatement (Second) Contracts, § 378 (Election Among Remedies) further
explains the doctrine:

If a party has more than one remedy under the rules stated in this Chapter,
his manifestation of a choice of one of them by bringing suit or otherwise is
not a bar to another remedy unless the remedies are inconsistent and the
other party materially changes his position in reliance on the manifestation.
Comment "a" of section 378 further clarifies the doctrine:
Election among remedies. The rules stated in this Chapter give a party three
basic types of remedies: [I] damages (Topic 2), [2] specific performance or
an injunction (Topic 3), and [3] restitution (Topic 4).
KTM repeatedly asserted to the trial court that it was seeking monetary damages
(not specific performance, injunction, or restitution). KTM also explained to the trial
court that Palmer v. Hayes actually supported position. [R. 1491-1493].
In Palmer, a buyer and seller entered into a purchase contract for a certain piece of
property wherein the buyer paid the seller a sum of earnest money. The buyer, however,
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breached the contract and requested the return of the earnest money. The seller refused to
return the earnest money and subsequently initiated a lawsuit against the buyer for breach
of contract. Ultimately, the court that the determined the buyer was entitled to summary
judgment because the seller had elected to keep the earnest money as liquidated damages,
and the doctrine of election of remedies precluded the seller from maintaining an action
for additional damages. The court explained that "before a seller may pursue a remedy
other than liquidated damages, the seller must release any claim to the deposit money."
Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d at 1062.
Palmer is clearly distinguishable from the matter before this Court. In Palmer, the
doctrine of election of remedies applied because the remedies sought were inconsistent.
The seller would receive a windfall if he were allowed to keep the liquidated damage
amount and bring an additional lawsuit for the damages caused by the breach because the
liquidated damages were meant to remedy the same wrong as the suit for damages. Thus,
allowing both remedies would provide a double recovery for the same harm. In the
current matter, no similar windfall was possible because KTM was not seeking
inconsistent or duplicative remedies.
Appellee sought only to recover the damages associated with Appellants'
fraudulent (and negligent) acts and for the breach of the contract. KTM's damages are
divided into reliance damages (i.e. expenses incurred for preparation of the closed-door
pharmacy and not within the scope of the Contract), lost profits, and punitive/treble
damages upon proving fraud. Each of these three types of damages would compensate
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KTM for the harms associated therewith (pre and post contract). These categories of
damages do not overlap or provide duplicative remedies for the same harm.
By improperly dismissing KTM's fraud claims several months before jury trial,
the trial court effectively eliminated KTM's ability to seek punitive/treble damages under
Utah Code Ann. §78B-8-201-an award of which would have been based on KTM first
establishing damages under its breach of contract claim.
2.

The economic loss doctrine does not bar KTM's fraud-based claims.

The economic loss doctrine prohibits tort actions to recover purely economic
losses when the parties have a written contract governing the parties' conduct. See SME

~

Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, <JI 32, 28 P.3d
669 ("[t]he economic loss rule is a judicially created doctrine that marks the fundamental
boundary between contract law, which protects expectancy interests created through
agreement between the parties, and tort law, which protects individuals and their property
from physical harm by imposing a duty of reasonable care." (Internal citations and
quotations omitted)). "Thus, our formulation of the economic loss rule is that a party
suffering only economic loss from the breach of an express or implied contractual duty
may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of care under
tort law." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, ~I 16, 48 P.3d 235 (quoting Grynberg v.
Agric. Tech, Inc., 10 P.3d 1267, 1269 (Colo. 2000)).
To determine whether the economic loss doctrine applies to a particular claim,
courts must focus on whether the tort claims arise from a duty independent from those
encompassed by the contract. Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, ~[ 16 ("[t]herefore, the initial
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inquiry in cases where the line between contract and tort blurs is whether a duty exists
independent of any contractual obligations between the parties. When an independent
duty exists, the economic loss rule does not bar a tort claim 'because the claim is based
on a recognized independent duty of care and thus does not fall within the scope of the
rule."' (Quoting Town of Alma v. Azco Const.,Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1263 (Colo. 2000)).
KTM's fraud-based claims were based upon an independent duty, separate and
~

distinct from the duties encompassed under the Contract. Specifically, KTM's tort claims
alleged that Appellants orchestrated a fraudulent scheme whereby Appellants utilized the
parties' negotiations, and ultimate contract with KTM-not for the purpose of changing
pharmaceutical providers-but for acquiring leverage by which to negotiate a more
favorable renewal contract with their current provider, SCP. In sum, KTM's fraud claims
were based on the assertion that Kolob and Apex never intended to honor their contract
with KTM but merely used KTM as a means to obtain leverage over a third party. This
theory was proven inasmuch as the jury determined that Appellants breached the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Furthermore, Utah courts have previously held that the legal theory of fraud is an
intentional tort not subject to the economic loss doctrine. See SM E Indus., 2001 UT 54, CJ[
32 n.8 (citing American Towers Owners Ass 'n v. CCI Mech., Inc, 930 P.2d 1182, 1190
n.11 (Utah 1996)) ("[P]laintiffs may recover purely economic losses in cases involving
intentional torts such as fraud, business disparagement, and intentional interference with
contract."); see also, Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass 'n v. Davencourt

at Pilgrims Landing, LC, 2009 UT 65,

iJ 38, 221

P.3d 234 ("And despite the recovery of
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what would otherwise be considered economic loss damages, claims arising under a
fiduciary duty, similar to fraud claims, lie outside the scope of the economic loss rule."
(Emphasis added) (citing Town of Alma, 10 P.3d at 1263 ("[S]ome torts are expressly
designed to remedy pure economic loss (e.g., professional negligence, fraud, and breach
of fiduciary duty)." (Emphasis added)).
KTM asserted that Appellants acted with fraudulent intent during the course of
contract negotiations and then fraudulently used the new Contract with KTM to renegotiate their original agreement with SCP . During trial, Mr. Olson was unable to
explain why Kolob would sign an entirely new contract with SCP (shortly after signing
the Contract with KTM) where the original contract with SCP was still in effect and
would have been auto-renewed in October 2010 in any case.
KTM should have been allowed to bring its fraud-based claims given the fact that
neither the election of remedies doctrine nor the economic loss rule apply. Accordingly,
this Court should reverse the trial court's dismissal of KTM's fraud-based claims under
the correctness standard of review.

C.

The trial court erred in determining that Appellee was not entitled to
prejudgment interest under the terms of the Contract or, alternatively, by
statute.
After trial in this matter, the jury found that Kolob had breached the relevant

contract as well as the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and that KTM had suffered
"loss profit" damages in the amount of $143,989.00 as well as consequential damages in
the amount of $120,000.00. [See Second Special Verdict Form, R. 2554-2562]. KTM
delivered a proposed judgment document to Appellants that included an award of
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prejudgment interest at the rate of 1.5%. This interest rate was based on paragraphs 2(a)
~

and 4(a) and (c) of the Contract
Appe11ants objected to KTM's inclusion of prejudgment interest based on the
Contract. However, Appellants agreed that KTM was entitled to statutory prejudgment
interest of 10% per annum based on Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1(2) stating:
The 1.5% penalty provision, by its terms, does not apply to contractual
breaches. Therefore, there is no basis for this court to calculate prejudgment
interest at 1.5% per month rate. Rather, the appropriate rate of interest is
"I 0% per annum," which is the default rate of interest for cases involving a
breach of contract. See Francis v. National DME, 2015 UT App 119, <JI<JI 3944 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (2)). Under this approach, the
appropriate judgment, including prejudgment interest, is $363,081.37.
[R.3933].
On February I 0, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the matter and determined
that KTM was not entitled to any prejudgment interest whatsoever. In reaching this
decision, the trial court relied on Shoreline Dev. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct.

~

App. 1992). [R. 3959-3960].
For purposes of this appeal, KTM does not argue that it is entitled to the
contractual 1.5% per annum interest. However, KTM does assert on appeal that the trial
court erred in denying KTM the 10% per annum prejudgment interest in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (2).
During the February 10, 2016 hearing, the trial court felt compelled to deny
statutory prejudgment interest to KTM because of specific language found in the

Shoreline Dev. case. The language that concerned the trial court is as follows:
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The determining factor in awarding prejudgment interest is whether the
damages upon which prejudgment interest is sought can be calculated with
mathematical certainty. A court can award prejudgment interest only when
the loss is fixed at a particular time and the amount can be fixed with
accuracy. If the jury must determine the loss by using its best judgment as
to valuation rather than fixed standards of valuation, prejudgment interest is
inappropriate. Shoreline Dev., 835 P.2d at 207 (Internal citations and
quotations omitted).
The trial court indicated:
This is the language I'm having a problem with. If the jury must determine
the loss by using its best judgment as to valuation rather than fixed
standards of valuation, prejudgment interest is inappropriate. I think that
prejudgment interest is inappropriate because this jury did not - and I see
no evidence, and I re - I don't see anything in the special jury verdict form
where they were giving a mathematical - they were giving a mathematical
way to calculate what those damages were.
Again, if there would have been a monthly on such and such a month, these
profits were lost, then I would - I would think that I could - there would be
a date and a time certain when that prejudgment interest would run. They
could not, as far as I can see - I mean they had to simply - there was no
fixed standards of valuation, and I think that prejudgment interest is
inappropriate.
[R. 4235].
The trial court, however, failed to consider the very next paragraph in the

Shoreline Dev. case. That paragraph clarifies that the Utah Supreme Court has
indicated that the lack of mathematical certainty generally prevents an award of
prejudgment interest in equity claims (as opposed to claims on a written contract).
The Shoreline Dev. court then quotes the following language from Bellon v.

Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991):
A survey of our cases where prejudgment interest was awarded indicates
that interest has been allowed in actions for damage to personal property, in
actions brought on a written contract, and in an action to recover a
liquidated overpayment of water subscription charges. In many of these
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cases, we stressed that the loss had been fixed as of a definite time and
the amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy in
accordance with well-established rules of damages. No case has been
cited to us where we have allowed prejudgment interest in an action such as
the instant case, which is for equitable relief. A suit of this nature . . .
invokes consideration of the principles of equity which address themselves
to the conscience and discretion of the trial court. In view of the highly
equitable nature of this action where the court has discretion in determining
the amount, if any, to be [awarded to the plaintiff], we find no error in the
denial of prejudgment interest. (emphasis added) (citations omitted)
(quoting Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606, 610 (Utah 1976)).
The plaintiff in Shoreline Dev. had prevailed on an unjust enrichment claim
against Utah County for the amount of $94,000.00. The trial court did not award general
prejudgment interest due to the nebulous nature of the way in which the damage amount
was determined-and the Court of Appeals did not reverse that initial determination.
The case at bar does not involve an equitable claim-rather, the damages awarded
by the jury were based on breach of a written contract that contained an initial one-year
term.
Smith v. Fai,fax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, 82 P.3d 1064 is instructive as to the
standards under which prejudgment interest should be awarded. In that case, the
defendant was found liable for conversion, breach of partnership agreements and breach
of fiduciary duties. At trial, the plaintiffs were awarded compensatory damages including
prejudgment interest and punitive damages. Id. at.

<JI

I. On appeal, the defendant raised

several arguments including the argument that the plaintiffs were not entitled to
prejudgment interest.
The Utah Supreme Court upheld the award of prejudgment interest. In doing so,
the Court made several important observations. First, the Court cited to the earlier case of
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Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co. noting that "Utah courts award prejudgment interest in

cases where 'damages are complete' and can be measured by 'fixed rules of evidence and
known standards of value."' Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, ']I 17 (citing Fell
v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1007 (Utah 1907). The Court

also indicated that while the trial court had awarded prejudgment interest based upon the
breach of fiduciary duties by the defendant, the award was still supportable under the
criteria established in the Fell case. The Court then quoted the Fell decision again:
The true test to be applied as to whether interest should be allowed before
judgment in a given case or not is, therefore, not whether the damages are
unliquidated or otherwise, but whether the injury and consequent damages
are complete and must be ascertained as of a particular time and in
accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value,
which the court or jury must follow in fixing the amount, rather than be
guided by their best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed for
past as well as for future injury, or for elements that cannot be measured by
any fixed standards of value.
Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, ']I 20 (citing Fell v. Union Pacific
Railway Co., 88 P. at 1007).

The Smith Court explains that while damages need not be liquidated, prejudgment
interest is typically denied where damage amounts are to be determined by the broad
discretion of the jury including all personal injury cases, cases of death by wrongful act,
libel, slander, false imprisonment and all cases where the damages are incomplete and are
peculiarly within the province of the jury to assess at the time of the trial. Id.
Importantly, the Smith Court indicates that fair market valuations of real property
are within the category of damages upon which prejudgment interest may be properly
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awarded. Quoting language from San Pedro, Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R. Co. v. Bd. of
Educ., 35 Utah 13, 99 P. 263, 267 (Utah I 909), the Smith Court reiterates:
We, therefore, have a case in which, for the purpose of fixing damages, the
injury is complete; the damages are ascertained by the ordinary rules of
evidence and according to a known standard or measure of value. And all
this must be determined from competent evidence, which is binding upon
both the court and jury. The jury, therefore, only had a right to exercise
their judgment within the limits of the evidence upon the question of
value. It is not a case where it was left to the jury to determine the amount
of damages from a mere description of the wrongs done or injuries inflicted
whether to person, property or reputation.
Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41,
(emphasis added).

<JI

22 (internal citations omitted)

The Smith Court concludes its analysis with the following statement:

(ii)

Where, as here, damages were complete as of the day the property was transferred
to the REIT and the jury based its award of damages on competent testimony from
an appraiser who used generally accepted principles in determining the market
value of the real property, an award of prejudgment interest is appropriate. The
fact that the parties disputed the value of the property at trial does not change our
conclusion that the jury's determination of the property's value was "ascertained
... in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value."
Fell, 88 P. at I 007. Therefore, we uphold the trial court's decision to award
prejudgment interest.
Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, <JI 23.
In sum, the Smith case stands for the proposition that a Jury is permitted to
exercise its judgment based on the evidence to determine a value: (I) so long as the injury
is "complete" and (2) "damages are ascertained by the ordinary rules of evidence and
according to a known standard or measure of value." In such cases an award of
prejudgment interest is appropriate.
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It is undisputed that in the instant case, the injury to KTM was "complete" and that
the damages were ascertained by the ordinary rules of evidence and according to a known
standard or measure of value. As a result, the jury exercised its judgment based on
evidence to determine the value of the Appellants breach of contract. That value was
placed at loss profit damages in the amount of $143,989.00 and consequential damages in
the amount of $120,000.00.
The trial court's primary concern was that the special verdict form did not include
a "mathematical way to calculate what those damages were." The trial court expressed
that if there would have been a "monthly" way to calculate lost profits (as opposed to the
damages based on the entire I-year period), then prejudgment interest might be
warranted. [R. 4235-4236]. This concern, however, was based upon the trial court
misconstruing Shoreline Dev. (a case, as previously pointed out, that was based on an
equitable award of damages, not a contract-based award of damages). The trial court
interpreted Shoreline Dev. to require a level of exactitude in determining damages that is

~

simply not required. As indicated in the Smith case, a jury is entitled to reach a valuation
of damages based on the evidence presented and in accordance with a known
Civ

standard/measure of value. There is no requirement that the jury verdict form contain a
specific mathematical equation for reaching damages.
It is clear upon review of the trial transcript that the jury received evidence that

was presented in accordance with a known standard/measure of value. In fact, both the
third day of trial and the fourth day of trial included extensive examination of Appellant's
expert (David Kammerer) concerning the profit or loss that KTM would have realized if
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Appellants had not breached the Contract. [See e.g. R. 3897, I 03:20-104:20; 3898, 7:22-

193:6]. During trial, Appellants submitted a profit & loss summary (admitted as
Defendants' exhibit 81) and a projected revenue/cost for Kolob's Medicare Part A &
Managed Care Residents admitted as Defendants' exhibit 85). [R. 3898: 24:2; 65: I 0].
KTM also submitted Meadow Valley Pharmacy's profit & loss statement for 2010
(admitted as Plaintiff's exhibit 49) and Meadow Valley Pharmacy's profit & loss
statement for 201 I (admitted as Plaintiff's exhibit 50). [R. 3897, 13:1; 16:13].
The Contract itself was for an initial term of one year. The jury relied upon the
term of the Contract, the numerical data and testimony of Appellants' expert to reach its
final valuation of damages. 8 This approach is "mathematically" sufficient under the
standard outlined in Smith to support an award of prejudgment interest in favor of KTM
starting from the beginning date of the Contract.
Finally, it bears repeating that Appellants acknowledged KTM's statutory right to
@

prejudgment interest under Utah Code Ann. § I 5-1-1 (2) both in their motion and during
the February 10, 2016 hearing. 9 [R. 3930-3934; 4223]. Under the "correctness standard,"
this Court should reverse the trial court's determination that KTM was not entitled to

8

KTM's expert on damages, Scott Kimber, was not called to testify because Appellants'
expert, David Kammerer, provided sufficient testimony and evidence of KTM's
damages.
9
During the February 10, 2016 hearing, counsel for Appellants stated: "Now it doesn't
mean KTM isn't entitled to prejudgment interest. I think it's because the Utah code
provides a default rate of interest cases involving a breach of contract, and that's in
Section 15-1-1, which provides a default rate of IO percent per annum in cases involved
in breach of contract, at least that's how it's been interpreted by the courts.
Using this calculation, we would say that KTM is entitled to prejudgment interest in the
amount of $99,092 for a total judgment of $363-$363,087." [R. 4223].
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statutory prejudgment interest at the rate of I 0% per annum pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§15-1-1(2).

X.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Appellee respectfully requests that the Court:
1.

Uphold the Second Special Verdict Form finding that the trial court did not err in
sending the jury back to clarify the inconsistencies in the first Special Verdict
Form;

2.

Determine that the trial court did not err in denying Appellants' Motion for New
Trial;

3.

Determine that the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony of Bryan
Nichols as to industry standard contracts in closed-door pharmacy agreements;

4.

Determine that Appellee's fraud-based claims were improperly dismissed;

5.

Determine that the trial court erred in denying Appellee prejudgment interest in
the statutory amount of 10% pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1(2).

DATED AND SIGNED May 12, 2017.
HEIDEMAN & ASSOCIATES

ls/Justin D. Heideman
JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellee/Cross-Appellant_KTM Health Care, Inc.
~
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CASE NUMBER 100503405 Contracts

The above Jury Trial Preparation/Argument hearing will not include
Deft 1 s Motion in Limine Re Evidence Of Pharmacist Hired by Meadow
Valley Pharmacy,

and any other pending Motion(s) before the Court.

09-02-14 FINAL PRE TRIAL CONFERENCE Modified.
Reason: Court order
09-02-14 JURY TRIAL PREPARATION/ARGUE scheduled on October 02,

2014 at

09:00 AM in Courtroom 30 with Judge WILCOX.
09-02-14 Filed: Notice for Case 100503405 ID 16157557
09-05-14 Fee Account created

<i 09-05-14 Fee Account created
09-05-14 AUDIO TAPE COPY

Total Due:

10.00

Total Due:

1.00

Payment Received:

10.00

Payment Received:

1.00

Note: POSTAGE-COPIES
09-05-14 POSTAGE-COPIES

@ 09-05-14 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION IN LIMINE/ELECTION OF

Judge:
Clerk:

JEFFREY C WILCOX
judymb

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney (s) : JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN
<i)

Defendant's Attorney (s) : GARY R GUELKER
JANET I JENSON
Audio
Tape Number:

3D/jb

Tape Count: 10.00-11.00

HEARING
The Court has rec'd all briefs and reviewed the same in depth.
10:03

Mr. Guelker's record proceeds first as he addresses items

raised in Mr. Heideman 1 s response to his Motion Requiring Plaintiff
to Elect it's Remedies.

The Court has no questions for Mr.

Guelker.
10:06

Mr. Heideman•s response and supporting argument, which

refers to legal precedents as stated, is made to the record.
10:13

Court makes a record that it finds Plaintiff KTM Health

Printed: 07/07/16 12:08:51
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(i)

CASE NUMBER 100503405 Contracts
Care Inc HAS made it's election.

This Court's issue now considered

is Post Contract Torte Duties, i.e.
fiduciary, which the Court states it does NOT find there are
fiduciary duties to consider.
Mr. Guelker will prepare this Order of finding as directed.
10:26

Mr. Heideman requests the Court confirm the ruling

regarding pre contract claim.

This is opposed in response by Mr.

Guelker, who also addresses his Motion to Exclude Evidence Re:
Pharmacists.
10.54

Arguments on that are heard.

Court's finding in Denial of Motion in Limine and arguments

may be made during the jury trial.
Mr. Heideman will prepare this Order.
Deadline dates are now set for new jury instructions,
questionnaire, verdict.
Final PTC and Jury Trial calendar remains as currently set.
Off record.
09-12-14 Note: JURY TRIAL PREPARATION/ARGUE calendar modified.
09-13-14 Filed: Order (Proposed) Regarding Defendants Motion in Limine
09-13-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
09-16-14 Filed order: Order Regarding Defendants Motion in Limine

Judge JEFFREY C WILCOX
Signed September 16, 2014
09-16-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
09-19-14 Filed: Jury Instructions Joint Submission of Disputed and

Undisputed Jury Instructions
09-19-14 Filed: Plaintiffs Proposed Special Verdict Form
09-19-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
09-23-14 Filed:

: Defendants Proposed Special Verdict Form

(iJ

09-23-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
09-24-14 Filed: Exhibit List Plaintiffs Third Amended Trial Index
09-24-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
09-24-14 Filed: Motion to Reconsider Order Dismissing Fraud Claims

~

Filed by: KTM HEALTH CARE INC,
09-24-14 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Order

Printed: 07/07/16 12:08:51
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CASE NUMBER 100503405 Contracts
206 West Tabernacle
St. George, UT

4i

84770

Before Judge: JEFFREY C WILCOX
Hearing on Objections to Proposed Order
01-14-16 OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER scheduled on February 10, 2016 at
10:30 AM in Courtroom 3D with Judge WILCOX.
01-14-16 Filed: Notice for Case 100503405 ID 17177560
01-14-16 Filed: Other - Unsigned Judgment (Proposed)
01-14-16 Note: Please resubmit judgment after hearing on objections to
proposed judgment on 2/10/2016.
01-14-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
02-10-16 Minute Entry - OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER
Judge:

JEFFREY C WILCOX

Clerk:

j udymb

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN
Defendant's Attorney(s): GhRY R GUELKER
Audio
Tape Number:

3D/jb

ij)

Tape Count: 10.41-11.22

Justin Heideman and Gary Guelker are present in the courtroom for
the Plaintiff and Defendants, respectively.
~lr. Guelker's objection focuses en two issues; Pre Judgrnt Interest
and Costs.
10.42

Mr. Guelker supports his objection first as to Pre Jdgmt

Interest.
10.52 Mr. Heideman responds on this issue only.
rest.
10.58

Both sides

The Court finds that pre judgment interest does not applr

and refers to the guiding statute.
Mr. Heideman supplements his record as to the effective date of
contract, and the Court also cites Rule 54E as to accrual of post
judgmt interest from the rendering of the Verdict on Oct 31 2014,
for the jury's damage award.
Pri~ted: 05/10/17 17:12:48
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CASE NUMBER 100503405 Contracts
11.12

Mr. Guelker now addresses the issue of costs,

accounting breakdown for the Court,
11.16

Mr. Heideman responds;

including an

further requesting denial.

followed by final word of Mr.

Guelker.
11.21

Court grants Judgmt for costs, with post judgment interest

as stated.

Mr. Heideman prevails and will submit an appropriate Order,
following R7, and within a week, as stated.
11.22

Off r~cord.

03-18-16 Filed: Judgment
~

(Proposed)

03-18-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
03-25-16 Filed judgment: Judgment
Judge JEFFREY C WILCOX
Signed March 25, 2016
03-25-16 Judgment #1 Entered$ 286680.65
Debtor:

APEX HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS LLC

Debtor:

SG NURSING HOME LLC

Creditor: KTM HEALTH CARE INC
15,048.45 Costs
2.13 PreJdmtint
271,630.07 Principal
286,680.65 Judgment Grand Total
03-25-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
03-25-16 Case Disposition is Judgment
(.i)

Disposition Judge is JEFFREY C WILCOX
04-08-16 Filed: Motion For New Trial Under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure
Filed by: APEX HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS LLC,

@

04-08-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
04-29-16 Filed: Opposition to Defendants Motion for New Trial on the
Issue of Consequential Damages
04-29-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
05-13-16 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of ~Jotion for New Trial

a

05-13-16 Filed: Request/Notice to Submit Defendants Motion for New Trial
05-13-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Printed: 0Sil0/17 17:12:48

Page 49

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 49 of 50

ADDENDUM 3: June 5, 2014 Minute Entry

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASE NUMBER 100503405 Contracts
Location: Courtroom 3D
St. George Courthouse
206 West Tabernacle

St. George, UT

84770

Before Judge: JEFFREY C WILCOX

(i 06-03-14 Filed: Notice for Case 100503405 ID 15980023
06-03-14 Filed:

: Defendants Disputed and Undisputed Jury Instructions

06-03-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-03-14 Filed:

: Defendants Disputed Special Verdict Form

06-03-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
~

06-03-14 Filed: Jury Instructions Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions

and Special Verdict Form
06-03-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-03-14 Filed:
@

: Summaries of Defendants Objections to KTMs Proposed

Jury Instructions
06-03-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-03-14 Filed: Affidavit/Declaration:

Declaration of Gary R. Guelker

Regarding the Timing of His Motion in Limine to Exclude
Pharmacist
@ 06-03-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification

06-03-14 Filed: Plaintiffs Deposition Designation {Litton)
06-03-14 Filed: Summary of Plaintiffs Objections to Defendants Proposed

Jury Instructions
@ 06-03-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification

06-03-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-05-14 Filed order: Order Stipulated Order re: Motion in Limine

(Kimber)
Judge JEFFREY C WILCOX
Signed June OS, 2014
06-05-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-05-14 Filed: Objection to Summary of Plaintiffs Objections to

Defendants Proposed Jury Instructions
@ 06-05-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification

06-05-14 Minute Entry - Minutes for JURY TRIAL STATUS

Judge:
Clerk:

JEFFREY C WILCOX
judymb

TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s}: JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN
Printed: 07/07/16 12:08:51
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CASE NUMBER 100503405 Contracts
Defendant's Attorney(s): GARY R GUELKER
JANET I JENSON
Audio
Tape Number:

3D/jb

Tape Count: 4.42-5.23

HEARING
All Counsel appear telephonically to review recently filed
pleadings which leave issues unresolved and/or unruled.

These

issues are legal and evidentiary in scope, needing decisions by the
Court.

Mr.

Heideman feels they can be addressed in the time of the trial,
outside the presence of the jurors.
Ms. Jenson raises concerns as to the remedies sought being

4:45

unclear thereby hampering her preparation of defense.

The Court

shares those concerns after this past week's filings.
4:51

The trial set for next week is cancelied and the Court's

record is made.

4:54 Heideman responds, citing various authorities

in support of his position.
Briefing on the election of remedies is allowed; to be done by Def
Counsel.

Mr. Heideman may respond if he chooses to do so.

ONE

brief each and deadlines are set.
One of the two current Motions in Limine may be moot due to the
new trial date set.

Mr. Guelker verbally withdraws that Motion,

leaving one to be ruled on.
New pre trial hearing dates and 3 Day Jury Trial are set as
outlined below.

Mr. Guelker and Ms. Jenson will prepare today's

Order.
MOT IN LIMINE/ELECTION OF REME is scheduled.
Date: 09/05/2014
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom 3D
Printed: 07/07/16 12:08:51
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